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Abstract
In recent decisions,’ Florida courts have allowed tenants to recover
damages from landlords resulting from criminal acts of third parties
which occurred on the landlord’s premises.
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Introduction
In recent decisions,' Florida courts have allowed tenants to recover
damages from landlords resulting from criminal acts of third parties
which occurred on the landlord's premises. These decisions raise ques-
tions regarding the basis of the landlord's duty to provide security, the
foreseeability of the crime, and the standard of care to which the land-
lord will be held.
The decisions of Florida District Courts of Appeal which have ad-
dressed the issue share common denominators which will serve to nar-
row the focus of this note. Each of the three cases dealt with a land-
lord-tenant relationship in a residential setting where the tenant was
the victim of a violent crime.2 The criminal's access to the premises
was accomplished in each instance by entry through a common area.
The landlord in all three situations had no prior connection with the
criminal; but each landlord had some form of notice of previous crimes
on the premises or in the surrounding area.
There is a dearth of Florida casess on the issue of a landlord's
liability to his tenant for the violent crimes of a third party. The three
district courts which have addressed the issue proposed criteria, albeit
hazy, for the finding of duty and foreseeability. Equally vague are the
courts' guidelines establishing the standard of care to which the land-
1. Ten Assocs. v. McCutchen, 398 So. 2d 860 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1981);
Whelan v. Dacoma Enterprises, Inc., 394 So. 2d 506 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1981);
Holley v. Mt. Zion Terrace Apts., Inc., 382 So. 2d 98 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
2. The court in Holley describes these reported crimes as "class one" presumably
indicating those crimes which are typified by personal injury to the victim. 382 So. 2d
at 99.
3. Judge Letts' majority opinion expressly notes the scarcity of Florida case law
on the question of a landlord's liability to his tenants for the violent crimes of a third
party. 394 So. 2d at 507
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lord is to be held.4 In the following discussion an attempt will be made
to predict the possible responses of Florida courts to the questions of: a)
whether a landlord has a duty to provide the tenant with security in the
leased premises; b) whether the foreseeability of criminal activity on
the leased premises can be imputed to the landlord; and c) to what
standard of care is the landlord to be held.
Traditionally the landlord has been insulated from liability to his
tenant. Consideration will be given to changes in the legal relationship
between the landlord and tenant which have caused a diminution in the
traditional insulation. In addition, leading cases from other jurisdic-
tions which have addressed the issue of landlord liability will be ex-
amined along with the reaction of Florida courts to these decisions.
Background
The court's reluctance to impose liability on landlords for the
criminal acts of third parties has its discernable roots in the agrarian
based landlord-tenant relationship. 5 The nature of this relationship at
early common law centered upon the conveyance of land for a term of
years, or an estate at will6 which gave the tenant a property interest in
the land.7 Once this interest vested, the tenant acquired exclusive pos-
session of, and control over, the land. 8 With power and control came
the tenant's unfettered ability to provide self-protection., Hence, it was
unreasonable to impose upon the landlord liability for injuries occur-
ring on property over which he had no control or present possessory
interest.' 0
4. 398 So. 2d 860; 382 So. 2d at 100-01.
5. Kline v. 1500 Massachusetts Ave. Apt. Corp., 439 F.2d 477, 481 (D.C. Cir.
1970).
6. 2 W. Blackstone, Commentaries* 140-42.
7. 2 R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 7 221 [1] (P.J. Roahn rev.
1977); 1 CASNER, AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 1.11 (1952).
8. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY, Historical Perspective
(1977); see generally R. BOYER, SORVEY OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY (3d ed. 1981) for
a discussion of the nature of the leasehold as a mutant of personal and real property
interests.
9. R. SCHOSHINSKI, AMERICAN LAW OF LANDLORD TENANT § 1.3 (1980).
10. W. PROSSER, THE HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 63 (4th ed. 1971);
see generally AMERICAN LAW OF LANDLORD TENANT, note 9 supra for a thorough
2
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Traditional theories of tort liability for acts of a third party were
equally narrow."" The general rule, that no duty is placed on an indi-
vidual to control the behavior of a third party which results in physical
harm to another is reflected in the Restatement (Second) of Torts.2
But, as set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Torts, the general rule
has two exceptions: when "(a) a special relation exists between the ac-
tor and the third party which imposes a duty upon the actor to control
the third person's conduct; or (b) a special relation exists between the
actor and the other which gives to the other a right to protection."13
Employing these exceptions Florida courts have limited finding the ex-
istence of a special relationship to innkeeper-guest, common carrier-
passenger, and business-invitee relationships.' 4 The landlord-tenant re-
lationship has not yet been recognized as sufficiently special for the
purpose of imposing liability on the landlord.' 5
Evolution of the Traditional Theories in Kline v. 1500
Massachusetts Avenue, Inc.
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit considered the traditional landlord-tenant relationship in Kline
v. 1500 Massachusetts Avenue Apartments, Inc. 6 The plaintiff in
Kline was a female tenant residing in the defendant's high rise apart-
treatment of the agrarian tenurial relationship and its gradual progression into the con-
temporary landlord-tenant setting.
11. SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 9, § 4.1.
12. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) oF TORTS § 315 (1965).
13. Id.
14. Orlando Executive Park, Inc. v. P.D.R., 402 So. 2d 442 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct.
App. 1981); Reichenback v. Days Inn of America, Inc., 1981 Fla. Law Weekly 1673
(Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. July 15, 1981); Werndli v. Greyhound Corp., 365 So. 2d 177
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1978); Robart v. Jordan Marsh Co., 305 So. 2d 255 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
15. See note 42 and accompanying text infra. Although Florida district courts
have imposed a landlord's duty to take reasonable security measures in the face of
foreseeable criminal acts of a third party, the duty stems from either contract obliga-
tion, the foreseeability of the criminal acts, or a combination of both. 382 So. 2d 98;
398 So. 2d 860; 394 So. 2d 506. None of the Florida district court decisions imposing
the duty do so on the basis of a special relationship between the landlord and tenant.
Id.
16. 439 F.2d 477 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
147 1
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ments.'7 She was robbed and assaulted in the hallway of her apartment
building and she sought compensation for the injuries she had received.
When the plaintiff initially moved into the building the defendant
provided its tenants with some security measures. There were attend-
ants by the front door and in the lobby of the building on a round-the-
clock schedule. In addition, garage attendants locked street entrances
when they went off duty in the evening. These measures deteriorated
to such a degree that, at the time plaintiff was assaulted, the building
was unattended and frequently left unlocked. As a result, criminal ac-
tivity, of which the landlord had notice, occurred on the premises. 18
Analyzing the traditional theories governing landlord liability,19
the court discussed the landlord's early common law insulation from
liability to tenants and its evolution into the present day landlord's duty
to use reasonable care in maintenance of common areas. 0 The court
noted that this duty was based on the landlord's exclusive control over
undemised areas. Furthermore, the court recognized that the landlord.
would be liable for tenant injuries caused by his failure to use reason-
able care in the maintenance and repair of common areas.21
After discussing the general rule that individuals are under no
duty to protect others from the crimes of third parties, the Kline court
17. The Kline court notes that portions of defendant's building housed office
space. Id. at 487 n.24. This fact is not determinative to the Kline court in light of the
fact that the assault on plaintiff took place well past normal business hours.
To this we add our own comment that it is unlikely ... that a patron
of one of the businesses, even if disposed to criminal conduct, would have
waited for five hours after the usual closing time to perpetrate his crime -
especially one of a violent nature. Further, although it is not essential to
our decision in this case, we point out that it is not at all clear that a
landlord who permits a portion of his premises to be used for business
purposes and the remainder for apartments would be free from liability to
a tenant injured by the criminal act of a lingering patron of one of the
businesses. If the risk of such injury is forseeable, then the landlord may
be liable for failing to take reasonable measures to protect his tenant from
it.
Id.
18. Id. at 479.
19. See notes 9-14 and accompanying text supra.
20. 439 F.2d at 480-81.
21. Id. at 481; see also Marlo Invs., Inc. v. Verne, 227 So. 2d 58 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 1969).
4
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listed the traditional reasons for its application to the landlord-tenant
relationship:
judicial reluctance to tamper with the traditional concept of the
landlord-tenant relationship; the notion that the act of a third per-
son in committing an intentional tort or crime is a superseding
cause of the harm to another resulting therefrom; the oftentimes
difficult problem of determining foreseeability of criminal acts; the
vagueness of the standard which the landlord must meet; the eco-
nomic consequences of the imposition of the duty; and conflict with
public policy of allocating the duty of protecting citizens from
criminal acts to the government rather than the private sector. 22
Implicit in this catalogue of reasons is the court's hesitancy to establish
a duty for which a basis and standard of care are difficult to ascertain.
On the other hand the Kline court stated that "the rationale falters
when it is applied to the conditions of modern day apartment living
. . . .The rationale of the general rule exonerating a third party from
criminal attack has no applicability to the landlord-tenant relation-
ship."23 Thus, the establishment of the landlord's duty to use reasona-
ble care to protect a tenant from the foreseeable crimes of a third
party24 ultimately rests 6n the anachronistic character of the general
rule and the foundation laid by the duty to use ordinary, reasonable,
prudent care in the maintenance of common areas.
In establishing the landlord's duty, the Kline court emphasized the
landlord's control over the common areas and his power to regulate
security.25 This power and control over the common areas has shifted
from the tenant, where it rested in the agrarian relationship, to the
landlord in the contemporary setting. In the court's opinion the tenant
22. 439 F.2d at 481.
23. Id.
24. The court in Kline declines credit for creating this exception to the general
rule choosing rather to view the decision as an amplification of the holding in Kendall
v. Gore Properties, Inc., 236 F.2d 673 (D.C. Cir. 1956). Id. at 485 n.19. The court in
Kendall was faced with an issue which can be distinguished from Kline in that plain-
tiff's decedent in Kendall was strangled by an employee of the landlord. The gravamen
of plaintiff's complaint was not the landlord's failure to provide adequate security but
rather the negligent hiring and supervision of the employee.
25. 439 F.2d at 481.
!
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no longer has the control and the power necessary to adequately protect
himself against the violent crimes of third parties. This shift of power,
coupled with the landlord's notice of criminal activity on the premises
led the court to conclude that "it d[id] not seem unfair to place upon
the landlord a duty to take those steps which are within his power
[and] to minimize the predictable risk to his tenant."26 This analysis
provided the reasoning underlying imposition of tort based liability on
the landlord. It stopped short, however, of declaring the landlord-tenant
relationship as 'special' for the purpose of establishing a prima facie
duty such as found in the innkeeper-guest relationship.
The court broadly defined foreseeability in terms of the probability
and the predictability of the criminal acts of third parties.27 Other
than the broad range of conceivable situations suggested by these
terms, the Kline decision offered no guidelines as to fact patterns which
might be predictable or establish foreseeability. The court recognized
that the finding of a duty without guidelines would result in uncertain
and inconsistent application of the duty,28 but the standards it set forth,
i.e., predictability and probability, do little to alleviate these pitfalls.29
After examining the traditional property interpretation of the
leasehold interest, which it found to be anachronistic,30 the court sug-
gested an alternative basis of recovery founded on contract theory. The
basis for this alternative recovery is found in the holding of Javins v.
First National Realty Corp.31 Javins advocated departure from the
feudal based interpretation of the landlord-tenant relationship in favor
26. Id.
27. Id. at 483. The court takes issue with the looser definition set forth by the
New Jersey Supreme Court in Goldberg v. Housing Auth. of Newark, 38 N.J. 578,
186 A.2d 291 (1962) which defined foreseeability with a view towards possibilities as
opposed to probabilities. The Kline court presumably is not engaging in a semantic
discussion, but rather underscoring the thought that its decision is not a radical depar-
ture from prior case law. See note 24 supra.
28. 439 F.2d at 481.
29. See generally Selvin, Landlord Tort Liability for Criminal Attacks on Te-
nants: Developments Since Kline, 9 REAL EST. L.J., 311 (1981); Comment, The Land-
lord's Duty in New York to Protect His Tenant Against Criminal Intrusions, 45 ALB.
L. REv. 988 (1981); Note, Security: A New Standard For Habitability, 42 U. Prrr. L.
REv. 415 (1981).
30. 439 F.2d at 481. See note 25 and accompanying text supra.
31. 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
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of one based on contract theory, recognizing "the modern trend toward
treating leases as contracts [as] wise and well considered. ' 2 In Kline,
this interpretation was the groundwork for implying that the landlord
assumed a contractual obligation to provide security.3 3 The landlord's
power and control over common areas again were found at the heart of
his obligation.34 Kline suggests that the landlord's contractual obliga-
tions to repair the common areas may be more far-reaching than those
imposed by tort theories.35 By using contract theory the court placed
"the duty of taking protective measures guarding the entire premises
and the areas peculiarly under the landlord's control against the perpe-
tration of criminal acts upon the landlord, the party to the lease con-
tract who has the effective capacity to perform these necessary acts."36
Finally, the Kline court suggested a landlord's duty to provide se-
curity might be found by analogy to recognized special relationships.
37
The court suggested an analogy to the innkeeper-guest relationship38
because of its contractual nature and the court's perception of the land-
lord-tenant relationship as one of its modern equivalents.39 The analogy
is predicated on the identical factors used in establishing foreseeability
in tort and contract based duties: power and control. The court rea-
soned that where "the ability of one of the parties to provide for his
own protection has been limited in some way by his submission to the
control of the other, . . . [the] duty should be imposed upon the one
possessing control .... "40 However, courts of other jurisdictions have
overwhelmingly found the landlord-tenant relationship to be outside the
confines of recognized special relationships. 41 " Therefore, the analogy
based duty found in Kline has had, at best, a tepid reception.42
32. Id. at 1076.
33. 439 F.2d at 481.
34. Id. at 482.
35. See note 21 and accompanying text supra.
36. 439 F.2d at 482 (emphasis supplied).
37. Id. at 485.
38. Id. See also note 14 supra.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 483.
41. SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 9, § 1.3.
42. Gulf Reston Inc. v. Rogers, 215 Va. 155, 207 S.E.2d 841 (1974); Ten As-
socs. v. McCutchen, 398 So. 2d 860; Whelan v. Dacoma Enterprises, Inc., 394 So. 2d
506; Scott v. Watson, 278 Md. 160, 359 A.2d 548 (Ct. App. 1976); Hall v. Frakoni, 68
1511Landlord Liability for Crimes6:1981
7
Vliet: Landlord Liability to Tenants for Crimes of a Third Party: The St
Published by NSUWorks, 1981
152NoaLwJual618
Tort and contract theories as applied in Kline present litigants
with a practicable means of establishing a landlord's duty although the
innkeeper-guest analogy has met with little success. The remainder of
this note will examine Florida's reaction to tort and contract theories,
as well as the treatment they have received in other jurisdictions.
Florida's Reaction to Kline and its Progeny
The Kline court used the modern contractual construction of the
leasehold, as suggested in Javins,4 3 to find landlord duty, and Florida
generally has accepted the same interpretation of the leasehold inter-
est.44 This approach removes the obstacles associated with traditional
property-oriented methods of lease interpretation. Holley v. Mt. Zion
Terrace Apartments, Inc. and Ten Associates v. McCutchen45 acknowl-
edged the existence of a contractual duty to provide security. In neither
case did the landlord overtly assume to protect the tenant from crimes
of third parties.46
Florida's Third District Court of Appeal, in Holley47 approved and
followed the Kline inroads to landlord liability when it set aside a sum-
mary judgment in favor of the landlord.48 In Holley the defendant
leased an apartment located in a high crime area to the plaintiffs dece-
dent.49 The defendant instituted and charged fees over and above the
Misc. 2d 470, 330 N.Y.S.2d 637 (Civ. Ct. 1972); but see Trentacost v. Brussel, 82 N.J.
214, , 412 A.2d 436, 441 (1980) where the court in dictum indicates that reconsid-
eration of the feasibility of a special duty based on the landlord-tenant relationship
might be in order.
43. See note 31 and accompanying text supra.
44. The case generally credited as Florida's acceptance of a contractual interpre-
tation of the leasehold interest is Butler v. Maney, 146 Fla. 41, 200 S. 226 (1941).
45. 382 So. 2d 98; 398 So. 2d 860.
46. Presumably since Holley and McCutchen have legitimized recovery based on
implied contractual obligations the landlord's duty would be crystalline in a factual
setting with an express assumption of the landlord's obligation to provide security. Re-
search has not divulged a landlord who was willing to expressly assume this obligation.
Id. See note 15 and accompanying text supra.
47. 382 So. 2d 98.
48. Id. at 99-100. In order for the Holley court to find the existence of a genuine
issue of fact regarding the defendant's conduct which might give rise to liability, the
court first had to recognize that the landlord had a duty to provide security.
49. 382 So. 2d at 99.
6:18 !
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agreed rent for security measures it subsequently abandoned.50 The
court greatly emphasized that although the defendant continued to de-
rive income from these fees,51 none of this money was spent on security
the year plaintiff's decedent was raped and murdered.52 In finding that
a contractual duty to provide security existed, the court focused on the
defendant's continued acceptance of these additional monies. It found
that receipt of the fees raised a genuine issue as to whether the land-
lord had implicitly assumed to provide protective measures for the
tenants. The existence of this factual question required reversal of the
summary judgment; thus the cause was remanded for further
determination. 3
The Holley decision also established a duty on the landlord based
on the foreseeability of criminal acts as set forth in Kline. 4 The court
found foreseeability via its reference to the frequency of reported vio-
lent crimes on the landlord's premises. 55 The foundation for finding
foreseeability in Holley stemmed from defendant's notice of crime in
the area.56 Not only were crimes frequently reported, but the defen-
dant himself refused to accept cash for business transactions on the
premises.57
It is apparent that an individual landlord's notice58 of repeated
criminal incidents on, or near, his premises is determinative in finding
sufficient foreseeability to impose liability.59 A broad range of circum-
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 100.
54. Id. at 99.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 100.
57. Id. at 99.
58. An issue which conceivably would have a great impact on Florida's non-resi-
dent landlords deals with basing the duty to protect against foreseeable criminal acts
on constructive notice. The court in Kline refers to numerous police reports of crimes
on the landlord's premises and states that the "reports in themselves constitute con-
structive notice to the landlords." 439 F.2d at 479 n.2.
59. But see Trentacost v. Brussel, 82 N.J. at _, 412 A.2d at 443, where, in
dictum, the New Jersey Supreme Court indicates that a landlord's duty to protect ten-
ants from foreseeable criminal acts of third persons might be founded on a breach of
an implied warranty of habitability which the court reasoned "exists independently of
... [the landlord's] knowledge of any risks, [hence] there is no need to prove notice of
1531Landlord Liability for Crimes16:1981
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stances have provided a landlord with the necessary notice for the im-
position of a duty based on foreseeability. Florida decisions indicate
that the location of the landlord's premises in a high crime area may be
sufficient to impose this duty.60 Other jurisdictions have suggested that
any of the following factual settings warrant imposition of a foresee-
ability based duty: a) previous crimes specifically on the landlord's
property; 61 b) possession of "composite drawings of the suspect and a
general description of his modus operandi" coupled with the knowledge
that prior crimes meeting this description had occurred on, or near, the
landlord's premises,62 c) the posting of a notice by the landlord inform-
ing the tenants of the commission of crimes on the premises.6 3
The question of whether the criminal attack must occur in an area
under the landlord's exclusive control apparently presents little contro-
versy. The murder in Holley did not occur in the common area, under
the landlord's exclusive control; rather, the act occurred in the dece-
dent's apartment which was entered through a window adjoining the
building's common walkway. 4 However, this fact did not preclude re-
covery where "the basis of the plaintiff's case [was] the almost undis-
puted fact that the intruder could have entered the apartment only
through the common walkway . . . . 6
such a defective and unsafe condition to establish the landlord's duty." It could be
argued that faced with the proper situation New Jersey courts would dispense with the
notice requirement found in the vast majority of other jurisdictions. For a sampling of
these holdings, see cases cited in notes 59-61 infra.
60. 398 So. 2d 860; 394 So. 2d 506.
61. Scott v. Watson, 278 Md. at -, 359 A.2d at 554. The court in Scott
"think[s] this duty arises primarily from criminal activities existing on the landlord's
premises, and not from knowledge of general criminal activities in the neighborhood."
Id.
62. O'Hara v. Western Seven Trees Corp., 75 Cal. App. 3d 802, 142 Cal. Rptr.
487 (Ct. App. 1977). In addition, there apparently had been previous rapes in the same
building that the plaintiff inhabited. Id.
63. Sherman v. Concourse Realty Corp., 47 A.D.2d 134, 365 N.Y.S.2d 239
(App. Div. 1975); but see Dick v. Great South Bay Co., 106 Misc. 2d 686, 435
N.Y.S.2d 240 (Civ. Ct. 1981) wherein the court held that plaintiff's failure to prove
prior criminal activity did not negate her cause of action. Plaintiff sought recovery from
her landlord for injuries she suffered in a robbery in the hallway of her apartment
building. Id.
64. 382 So. 2d at 99.
65. Id. at 101. See also 75 Cal. App. 3d at -, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 490, wherein
10
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In Florida, the related question of whether a previous crime must
be of the same specific kind as the one complained of remains unan-
swered in the context of the landlord-tenant relationship. 6 The Court
of Appeals of the District of Columbia responded to the question in
Spar v. Oboya,67 where the tenant was shot as he was walking through
an unsecured door into the foyer of his apartment building. The land-
lord argued that a record of prior robberies was inadequate to establish
that he could have foreseen a shooting. 8 The court found no merit in
this argument in light of "evidence of (a) individual apartment units of
the building being burglarized . . ., and (b) the presence of unautho-
rized persons in the building."6 The court in Spar considered these
factors collectively and concluded the prior incidents were sufficient "to
have put . . . [the landlords] on notice of the likelihood of unautho-
rized entry into the building by persons with criminal intent."'70 It is
possible that a stricter standard than that used in Spar will be required
by Florida courts. The application of a stricter standard was suggested
by the Fourth District Court of Appeal in Relyea v. State.71 The plain-
tiff alleged that the assault and murder of students at a state university
was the result of inadequate security.7 2 However, plaintiff was unable
to prove the incidence of prior assaults on campus, the "similar crimi-
nal acts committed" requirement necessary for a successful recovery.73
the landlords "contend[ed] that the fact the assault took place inside [the tenant's]
apartment should absolve them, since she, not they had control over the common area.
This fact is not determinative. Failure to take reasonable precautions to safeguard the
common areas under ... [the landlord's] control could have contributed substantially,
as alleged, to [the tenant's] injuries." Id.
66. See dissenting opinion by Judge MacKinnon in Kline. He takes issue with a
finding of notice on the landlord's part arguing that evidence of "one solitary instance
of an assault and robbery is an insufficient base to support a finding that assaults and
robberies are a predictable risk from which the landlord would have every reason to
expect like crimes to happen again." 439 F.2d at 489.
67. 369 A.2d 173 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
68. Id. at 177.
69. Id.
70. 'Id.
71. 385 So. 2d 1378 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
72. Id. at 1383.
73. Id. The Relyea court upheld a judgment for the defendant insurance com-
pany based on the absence of prior crimes and consequently the unforseeability of the
incident complained of. Id. The State of Florida and its agents operating the university
155 1
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The sufficiency of foreseeability alone as a basis for imposition of a
duty in Florida is unclear. Holley recognized duties based on both fore-
seeability and contract theories, but the court never declared them to
be interdependent or independent. The Fifth District Court of Appeal
in Whelan v. Dacoma Enterprises, Inc.74 found a duty existed on the
part of the landlord to protect his tenant from the foreseeable criminal
acts of a third party despite the absence of any allegation of a contrac-
tual obligation. Certainly this holding suggests that the court is amena-
ble to imposition of a duty based on foreseeability alone.75 It could be
argued that this hypothesis is supported, implicitly, in Judge Beranek's
dissenting opinion in Whelan.7' He would require either the landlord's
express or implied contractual obligation to provide security prior to
in question were exempted from liability based on theories of sovereign immunity. Id.
at 1381.
74. 394 So. 2d 506. Although Whelan emanates from Florida's Fifth District,
the panel is comprised of Judges Letts, Downey and Beranek all of whom are Fourth
District judges. It could be argued that presented with a similar case the Fourth Dis-
trict would impose liability similar to that found in Whelan.
75. The court in Whelan notes the absence of any allegation of statutory viola-
tions on the landlord's part. FLA. STAT. § 83.51 (2)(a) (1973)(emphasis supplied)
provides:
Unless otherwise agreed in writing, in addition to the requirements of
subsection (1) which deals with health code violations and structural re-
quirements, the landlord of dwelling units other than a single-family home
or a duplex shall, at all times during the tenancy, make reasonable provi-
sions for:
1 . . . .
2. Locks & keys
3. The clean and safe condition of common areas ....
This portion of the Landlord Tenant Act apparently has never been presented as a
basis for recovery for injuries resulting from a criminal attack. The likelihood of suc-
cess on such a basis is limited in light of the holding in deJesus v. Seaboard Coast Line
R. Co., 281 So. 2d 198, 200 (Fla. 1973), and Beaches Hosp. v. Lee, 384 So. 2d 234,
237 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1980). Both the Florida Supreme Court and the First
District Court of Appeal concluded that violation of a statute which does not impose
strict liability is not negligence per se, but rather evidence of negligence. It is interest-
ing to note that FLA. STAT. § 83.51(2)(a) requires a landlord to employ reasonable
measures. This standard presents the same difficulties as tort and contract recoveries in
failing to establish parameters of conduct for the landlord. See note 89 and accompa-
nying text infra.
76. 394 So. 2d at 508-09.
1 156 Nova Law Journal 6:19811
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the imposition of duty." The dissent's addition of a prerequisite con-
tractual duty suggests that Judge Beranek also viewed the majority's
decision as approval for landlord duty based on foreseeability alone.
Whether Florida will impose a duty based solely on foreseeability
is clouded by the Third District Court of Appeal in the McCutchen
opinion.7 1 The court in McCutchen imposed a duty on a landlord to use
reasonable care in providing his tenants with protection against crimi-
nal acts of third parties without stating whether this duty arose from a
tortious or contractual basis. The facts in McCutchen showed the de-
fendant's apartment complex was located in a high crime area where
thdre had been "substantial criminal activity within the year prior to
the attack on McCutchen . . . . ,,7' Furthermore, defendant's adver-
tisements specifically referred to the provision of twenty-four hour se-
curity services.8 0 Based on these facts the court concluded that the
landlord "clearly recognized and assumed the duty to protect his te-
nants from foreseeable criminal conduct." 81 Noting the presence of
both foreseeability and express or implied contractual duties the court
specifically declined to decide "whether in Florida foreseeability alone
is a sufficient basis for finding the duty, or whether, in addition, a land-
lord must expressly or impliedly assume such a duty. '8 2
The stage is set for potential conflict between at least two of Flor-
ida's five judicial districts. There is a suggestion that the Whelan court
is amenable to the imposition of a landlord's duty based on foreseeabil-
ity alone.83 The McCutchen court expressly declined to decide whether
either tort or contract theories would serve independently as a basis for
finding a duty to provide security.8 Obviously, without a duty to pro-
vide security a landlord cannot be held liable for injuries resulting from
inadequate security. As such, the basis for the landlord's duty is a criti-
cal element of an action seeking recovery for injuries resulting from
inadequate security measures and clarity of the requisite basis of the
77. Id. at 508.
78. 398 So. 2d 860.
79. Id. at 1023.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 1024 n.2.
83. See note 74 and accompanying text supra.
84. See note 81 and accompanying text supra.
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duty undoubtedly would be helpful to litigants, their counsel and the
courts.
The decisions of Holley, McCutchen and Whelan 5 embrace the
landlord's duties under contract and tort theories to provide a tenant
with protection from the foreseeable crimes of a third party. The recog-
nition of the threshold requirement of duty, however, does not establish
a landlord's liability nor does it guarantee a tenant's recovery for inju-
ries suffered.88 The next question becomes: what measures must a
landlord take in order to discharge this duty? Certainly the answer to
this question is of paramount concern to the landlord, in his attempt to
avoid incurring liability, 7 and to the tenant, in his attempt to prove an
actionable breach of duty.88
As in most situations where the issue hinges upon an individual's
use of ordinary, reasonable, prudent care, Florida courts have placed
the responsibility of determining the issue on the jury.8 9 In attempting
to offer a prediction of the jury's determination of the standard of care,
85. See note 1 supra.
86. Navajo Circle, Inc. v. Developments Concepts Corp., 373 So. 2d 689, 691
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
87. "One who has performed his full duty with respect to the exercise of care is
not liable for an injury to the person of another .... " Robb v. Pike, 119 Fla. 833,
-, 161 So. 732, 734 (1935).
88. In addition to proving duty and subsequent breach the tenant should be
aware of possible defenses to actions sounding either in contract or in tort. A thorough
analysis of the possible defenses is beyond the scope of this note, however, see John's
Pass Seafood Co. v. Weber, 369 So. 2d 616 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1979); Smith v.
General Apt. Co., 133 Ga. 927, 213 S.E.2d 74 (Ct. App. 1975); FLA. STAT. § 83.47 for
an indication of the effect of exculpatory clauses on a landlord's liability to a residen-
tial tenant. See 382 So. 2d at 101; Scott v. Watson, 278 Md. 160, 359 A.2d 548 (Ct.
App. 1976); Gibson v. Avis Rent-a-Car Sys., Inc., 368 So. 2d 520 (Fla. 1980), for
rejections of arguments seeking to dispel liability based on proximate cause where the
foreseeability of intervention and the resultant avoidable harm is the negligent conduct
in itself. See Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973); Blackburn v. Dorta, 348
So. 2d 287 (Fla. 1977); Kuhn v. Harless, 390 So. 2d 721 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1980); 394 So. 2d at 508 for language to the effect that, in Florida, a plaintiff's com-
parative negligence would not preclude recovery.
89. "Under our system, it is peculiarly a jury function to determine what precau-
tions are reasonably required in the exercise of a particular duty of due care." 382 So.
2d at 100-01. See also Bennett v. Mattison, 382 So. 2d 873, 875 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 1980).
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consideration of the findings of other courts offer little elucidation.
Other courts have suggested provisions ranging from a lock "capable of
adequately performing the function to which it was put"90 to avoidance
of conditions which are "conducive to criminal assaults." 91 The spec-
trum of reasonable care seems to range from preventive measures92 to
steps which avoid fostering the criminal's purposes. 3 In essence the
range consists of the subtle distinction between keeping an incident
from happening and not promoting its occurence.
In light of the prominent role a jury plays in finding what is cur-
rently demanded of an ordinary, reasonable, prudent landlord, it is vir-
tually impossible to accurately predict what measures will satisfy a
landlord's duty in any but the most extreme cases. The Court of Ap-
peals of the District of Columbia Circuit in Ramsey v. Morrisette ad-
dressed the question of standard of care as follows: "We by no means
suggest that there is a general legal duty on the landlord to provide full
time resident managers or to install locks on the front door of an apart-
ment house. The test is what is reasonable in all the circumstances. '94
Ultimately, as suggested by Ramsey, and alluded to by the Florida
courts, the fact finder will have to make a determination of reasonable
care considering the facts and circumstances of each individual case.
Conclusion
Under traditional property interpretations of the leasehold interest,
and tort concepts basing liability on the existence of a special relation-
ship, a landlord was exempted from liability to a tenant for the crimi-
90. Warner v. Arnold, 133 Ga. App. 174, -, 210 S.E.2d 350, 353 (1974). It is
interesting to note that the Warner court defines adequate security measures in terms
of adequacy. The definition of a word which employs the word sought to be defined
has never proven effective and serves to emphasize the elusive nature of the standard of
care.
91. Johnston v. Harris, 387 Mich. 569, 198 N.W.2d 409 (1972). This case deals
with the inadequacy of locks and illumination. Apparently the testimony of a public
lighting expert who drew corollaries between the inadequacy of the lighting and the
high incidence of crime carried some weight in the court's decision.
92. E.g., the installation of locks. 133 Ga. App. 174, 210 S.E.2d 350.
93. E.g., increasing the intensity of lighting to provide an atmosphere which dis-
courages criminal activity. 387 Mich. 569, 198 N.W.2d 409.
94. 252 A.2d 509, 512 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
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nal acts of a third party. Two of Florida's district courts have limited a
landlord's exemptions and imposed upon him a duty to provide ade-
quate security measures in instances where a landlord has contractually
assumed that obligation or when criminal acts of third parties are fore-
seeable. 95 The question of whether Florida will impose a duty to pro-
vide security based on the tort concept of foreseeability alone remains
unanswered.
Even when the duty has been established, circumstances constitut-
ing foreseeability appear unsettled. Notice of prior criminal activity,
hence foreseeability, is elementary to the imposition of a duty.
Whether to constitute notice these prior activities must have occurred
on the landlord's premises and whether the incidents must be of the
same kind as the acts complained of remains unclear in the context of
the landlord-tenant relationship. 96 Furthermore, Florida decisions do
not indicate whether the landlord must have actual notice of the inci-
dents of crimes on, or near, his premises?
The determination of fulfillment of the standard of care continues
to be a factual question for the jury to decide. Cases from other juris-
dictions indicate that these decisions will be made on a case by case
basis. Florida courts have not expressly adopted the case by case ap-
proach in the context of a landlord's use of reasonable care to protect
his tenants from the criminal acts of third parties. However, applica-
tion of a case by case approach in the landlord-tenant context is proba-
ble in light of its use in other tort actions dependent on a standard of
reasonable care.
The threshold question of whether a landlord has a duty to protect
his tenants from the foreseeable criminal acts of third parties has been
answered affirmatively by two District Courts of Appeal in Florida.98
Now that a landlord is under an obligation to exercise reasonable care
in his provision of security against foreseeable criminal acts, the area of
liability resulting from a breach of this duty may be litigated more
often. With new cases will come clearer pronouncements by Florida
courts on the questions of the basis for the duty, the criteria for finding
95. Florida's Third District Court of Appeal in McCutchen and Holley, and
Florida's Fifth District Court of Appeal in Whelan.
96. See note 72 and accompanying text supra.
97. See note 57 and accompanying text supra.
98. See note 94 supra.
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foreseeability, and the standards of care to be employed when address-
ing the landlord's liability to his tenants for the crimes of a third party
made possible by inadequate security.
Theresa M. B. Van Vliet
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